2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

9-15-2009

Fleming Steel Co v. WM Schlosser Co Inc

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009

Recommended Citation
"Fleming Steel Co v. WM Schlosser Co Inc" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 661.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/661

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
Nos. 08-4617 and 08-4618
_____________
FLEMING STEEL COMPANY
v.
W.M. SCHLOSSER COMPANY, INC.
(D.C. Civil No. 02-00828)
____________
W.M. SCHLOSSER COMPANY, INC.
v.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY
(D.C. Civil No. 03-01338)
Fleming Steel Company and
Continental Casualty Company,
Appellants in No. 08-4617
W.M. Schlosser Company Inc.,
Appellant in No. 08-4618
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Nos. 02-cv-00828
and 03-cv-01338)
District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish
__________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on September 8, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, and
RENDELL and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 15, 2009)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Subcontractor Fleming Steel Co. (“Fleming”), and performance bond issuer
Continental Casualty Co. (“Continental”), appeal orders of the District Court granting
summary judgment, damages, and attorney’s fees in favor of prime contractor
W.M. Schlosser Co., Inc. (“Schlosser”), on claims arising from a U.S. Navy construction
contract.1 Schlosser cross-appeals, arguing that it was awarded insufficient interest. For
the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
We write for the benefit of the parties and only briefly summarize the relevant
facts. The Navy awarded Schlosser a contract to construct a “hush house” at Naval Air
Station Oceana in Virginia Beach, Virginia. A hush house is a test facility in which jet
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The specific orders challenged by Appellants are the Order of July 10, 2006 granting
summary judgment, the Order of July 14, 2006 dismissing objections to the special
master’s report and recommendations, the Judgment Order of July 14, 2006 entering
judgment in favor of Schlosser, the Order of August 7, 2006 denying a motion by
Appellants for reconsideration, and the Judgment Order of October 21, 2008 granting
additional damages pursuant to a motion by Schlosser.
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engines may be run at high power settings, and is designed to suppress the intense sound
generated during such runs. Schlosser subcontracted with Fleming to produce sliding air
intake doors for the facility, and Continental executed a performance bond on the
subcontract. The parties agree that, under a choice of law provision, Virginia law governs
the subcontract.
Key sound-suppressing components of the doors are 18 “splitter baffles,” made of
stainless steel and covered in fiberglass cloth. The specifications in the prime contract for
these baffles were incorporated into the subcontract. Section 13300 Paragraph 2.1.5.b
required the fiberglass cloth to be precisely 0.0065 inches thick, and specified that
“[n]otwithstanding any other requirements of th[e] contract, no other product will be
accepted.” Paragraph 1.4.2.1 required Fleming to produce a full-sized pre-production
specimen of a baffle that would “conform to all of the requirements of the contract
including quality control, testing, form, fit, size and function and shall meet all of the
requirements of the contract documents.” When approved by the Navy’s contracting
officer, this specimen was to “serve as the reference for establishing the acceptability of
all fabricated . . . baffles.”
Fleming produced a sample baffle, and it is undisputed that this sample was
approved by the Navy’s contracting officer. Fleming then began producing the baffles
intended for installation in the door. Inspections revealed that heat from Fleming’s
welding process burned away fiberglass cloth in certain places on nine of the production
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baffles. Re-inspection of the sample baffle revealed that the cloth on the approved
sample also had burn spots. The Navy concluded that the burned baffles failed to meet
specifications, and also determined that a repair method proposed by Fleming was
inadequate. The Navy issued cure notice to Schlosser, which in turn issued cure notice to
Fleming. Schlosser thereafter found Fleming to be in default, terminated the subcontract,
and sought replacement baffles from another source.
Article 8 of the subcontract provided that if Schlosser terminated the subcontract
due to Fleming’s breach, Fleming would be liable for the costs of completion, along with
other damages and expenses. Article 29 provided that, if the contract was terminated by
Schlosser for its own convenience, Fleming would be entitled to the actual costs of the
work and labor in place, plus a certain allowance.
Fleming filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania for breach of contract against Schlosser, arguing that the
termination was for convenience. Schlosser answered with a counterclaim for breach of
contract against Fleming. Schlosser also filed a claim on an indemnification theory
against Continental in the United Stated District Court for the District of Virginia, which
was transferred and consolidated with the former action. After discovery and a series of
rulings on various motions, the District Court granted partial summary judgment on
behalf of Schlosser, deciding as a matter of law that the Navy’s approval of the sample
baffle did not relieve Fleming from strictly complying with the written contract

4

specifications. The District Court also granted summary judgment on behalf of Schlosser
on the issue of liability. The District Court thereafter adopted the findings of a special
master with regard to damages, and also awarded attorney’s fees, costs, and a portion of
the prejudgment and postjudgment interest urged by Schlosser.
Fleming and Continental first challenge the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on behalf of Schlosser. The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment “is plenary, and
we apply the same standard as the District Court.” Busch v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist.,
567 F.3d 89, 95 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009). Summary judgment should be granted only if there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.
Appellants’ position on what legal effect the Navy’s approval of the sample baffle
should have on Fleming’s responsibilities required clarification in the District Court, and
may not have been entirely consistent. As Schlosser frames Appellants’ argument,
Appellants assert that the Navy’s approval of the sample waived any specifications that
would otherwise have been violated by the burned fiberglass cloth. At least before us,
Appellants do not argue waiver, but instead contend that, because the contract did not
specifically require the absence of burn marks, there is a genuine issue of fact as to
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whether the baffles met the written contract specifications. We are not persuaded by
either argument.
Fleming was required under Section 13300 Paragraph 1.4.2.1 to produce a
specimen that “conform[ed] to all of the requirements of the contract.” For all baffles,
Paragraph 2.1.5.d established that “[n]otwithstanding any other requirements of th[e]
contract,” including presumably the specimen approval requirement, any fiberglass cloth
that failed to meet the written specifications was unacceptable. (emphasis added).
Moreover, the subcontract incorporated 48 C.F.R. § 52.246-12 (Aug. 1996), a clause of
the Federal Acquisition Regulation governing the inspection of construction, which
provides that “Government inspections and tests are for the sole benefit of the
Government and do not . . . relieve the Contractor of responsibility for providing adequate
quality control measures,” and also that an inspector is not “authorized to change any
term or condition of the specification without the Contracting Officer’s written
authorization.” (emphasis added). There is no evidence that the contracting officer gave
any written authorization to alter the fiberglass specifications. Thus, the District Court
correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, Fleming was required to comply with all
contract specifications, notwithstanding the Navy’s approval of the specimen baffle.
We also conclude that there is no genuine issue as to whether the baffles with
burned fiberglass cloth failed to satisfy the written contract specifications. It is
undisputed that Fleming’s welding process burned fiberglass cloth away in certain places
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on the splitter baffles in question, thus altering the thickness of the cloth. It is also
undisputed that Paragraph 2.1.5.d of Section 13300 of the subcontract required the
fiberglass on the baffles to be 0.0065 inches in thickness. Under any reasonable
interpretation of the contract, Fleming failed to meet, at a minimum, the unambiguous
thickness specification of the contract at these burn points.2 For these reasons, we will
affirm the order of the District Court granting partial summary judgment on the issue of
the Navy’s approval of the specimen, and summary judgment on behalf of Schlosser on
the issue of liability.
Next, Appellants argue that the District Court erred by entering judgment on
damages based on the recommendations of the special master. Schlosser contends that
Appellants’ arguments on appeal are improper because Appellants failed to submit any
contrary evidence relating to damages, and never requested a hearing or trial on the issue
before the District Court. Assuming, arguendo, that Appellants’ arguments are properly
before us, we have no basis to disturb the District Court’s ruling. We will uphold the
factual findings of a special master that are adopted by a district court, unless the findings
are clearly erroneous. Arco Pipeline Co. v. SS Trade Star, 693 F.2d 280, 280-81 (3d Cir.
1982). The special master carefully documented and supported its computation of
damages, and, after making certain deductions from the amount urged, recommended an
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Although its decision is not under review in the instant appeal, the District Court
reached this same conclusion when it denied a motion for summary judgment by Fleming
by Order of August 19, 2005.
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award in the amount of $640,010.43. The District Court adopted this figure and, after
deducting the balance due Fleming under the subcontract, arrived at a damages figure of
$354,646.43. Upon careful review of the record, we find no defect in the computation of
damages, by either the special master or the District Court, that could amount to clear
error.
Finally, Appellants argue that the District Court erred by awarding attorney’s fees
to Schlosser. Appellants contend that Fleming could not be liable for attorney’s fees
under the terms of the subcontract, and that the liability of Continental, as surety, could be
no greater than the liability of Fleming. Schlosser contends, inter alia, that attorney’s
fees were available directly against Continental under the express terms of the
performance bond. As the District Court noted, “Under Virginia law, the obligation of
the of the surety is measured by that of the principal, ‘unless the bond provides otherwise,
or the surety has been released by some act of the obligee.’” (App. 62) (quoting Cohen v.
Mayflower Corp., 86 S.E. 2d 860, 866 (Va. 1955)). The performance bond expressly
provided that, in the event of Fleming’s breach, Continental would be liable to Schlosser
for “all fees, damages, and expenses, including costs and attorney’s fees.” (App. 138.)
Since Continental was liable for attorney’s fees under the terms of the performance bond,
the District Court did not err in awarding such fees to Schlosser.
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Schlosser cross-appealed two judgment orders,3 arguing that it should have been
awarded more prejudgment and postjudgment interest. We have carefully reviewed the
record and cannot say that the District Court erred in a conclusion of law or abused its
discretion with regard to the computation of interest.
For the reasons discussed above, we will AFFIRM the Orders of the District Court.

3

The specific orders challenged by the Cross-Appellant are the Judgment Order of
October 21, 2008, and the Second Amended Judgment Order of February 5, 2009.
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